Prof. Lewis~recentbook is an ambitious functionalist-comparative study of an aspect of religion which he claims has been neglected by social anthro pologists.
As the editor of Man and head of anthropology at the London School of Economics we can expe;t his work to be eagerly read by his colleagues. And as the book appears in paperback in a series designed to show the subject off to a wider pUblic we must expect it to be fairly influential.
Lewis is aware that his enterprise requires special pleading, and he is careful to avoid some of those ethnocentric· errors which marred an earlier comparative tradition; for instance, he does not rank religious systems as the Victorians were wont to do, nor does he engage in speculation over the genesis of religion as such.
Nevertheless, his endeavour seems to be marred by several rather profound methodological errors which ought to be exposed.
Firstly, he says that 'cultural distinctions' are ioften of much less oonsequence than functional similarities' (PP. [13] [14] .1 This, he suggests, is 'generally taken for granted in most of the fields in whioh social anthro pologists work'. . This stance enables him to ignore conoeptual levels, oategorical and linguistic problems and so to violate the oultural logio whioh one had assumed it was the task of the anthropologist to grasp.
Hocart (1935) asks~ 'How can we make any progress in the understanding 'of oulture if we per sist in dividing what the people join and in joining what they keep apart?' Lewis seems 'to have learned nothing from the ghastly failures of others who have attempted comparative work.
Hbcart's point, of oourse, does not make comparison impossible, but it does require the venture to be oonduoted with oertain speoial types of conoeptual tools; of this formal requirement Lewis seems oompletely unaware.
The point is to generate generalities from grasping oultural significanoe not to oonfirm general theories through riding rougrshod over oultural meanings by wielding some sooiologioalhypothesis like possession is a means by which women protest about their jural inferiority, eto. This is wherethe difference between L~vi-Strauss's and Lewis's oomparative work lies.
It isn't a matter of Gallio splendour but a simple methodologioal superiority in Levi-Strauss's work.· One only wished that Radoliffe-Brown, whose idea of anthropology as oomparative sooiology still sets the task for Lewis in 1971, had aotually engaged in some extensive projeot himself, then it would have emerged rather sooner just how unproduotive the enterprise would prove.
All oomparative work involves a problem of sources. We oannot evaluate Lewis's performanoe in this respeot.
What is worrying, beoause it does not seem to trouble his (do\vu-to-earth oOllml0nsense)sooiologioal approach, is the oategories with whioh he perfor.ms his analysis.
Let us remember the one time oommonsense oertainty that the earth was flat; sooiologioal commonsense is no more privileged simply by virtue of its being a part of an established aoademio disoipline.
We are aware of the diffioulties involved in using suoh terms as 'pathologioal' and 'hysterioal' in our mvn oUlture; the problems oonoerning their application to other oultures are even more oonsiderable. For instanoe, the oonoept of deviant would qualify as an 'odd-job'word (Wittgenstein) in our ovm oategory system.
We oannot simply plonk it into another system of disoourse without serious thought.
But the objeotion does not stop with these psyohologioal terms whioh are easily recognisable as being awkwardly oulture bound. What qualifioation oan we assume 'mystioal', 'witchoraft', 'anoestor oult' or even 'religion' to possess that fit them for oomparative purposes? Or Prof. Lewis~recentbook is an ambitious functionalist-comparative study of an aspect of religion which he claims has been neglected by social anthropologists.
As the editor of Man and head of anthropology at the London School of Economics we can expect his· work to be eagerly read by his colleagues. And as the book appears in paperback in a series designed to show the subject off to a wider pilblicwemust expect it to be fairly influential.
Firstly, he says that 'cultural distinctions' are i often of much less oonsequence than functional similarities' (PP. [13] [14] .~ This, he suggests, is 'generally taken for granted in most of the fields in whioh social anthropologists work'. . This stance enables him to ignore conoeptual levels, oategorical and linguistic problems and so to violate the oultural logio whioh one had assumed it was the task of the anthropologist to grasp.
Hocart ( Hocart's point, of oourse, does not make comparison impossible, but it does require the venture to be oonduoted with oertain speoial types· of conoeptual tools; of this formal requirement Lewis seems oompletely unaware.
The point is to generate generalities from grasping oul tural significanoe not to oonfirm general theories through riding rougrshod over oultural meanings by wielding some sooiologioalhypothesis like possession is a means by which women protest about their jural inferiority, eto. This is wherethe difference between L~vi-Strauss' sand Lewis' s oomparative work lies.
It isn't a matter of Gallio splendour but a simple methodologioal superiority in Levi-Strausn' s work.· One only vvished that Radoliffe-Brown, whose idea of anthropology as comparative sociology still sets the task for Lewis in 1971, had aotually engaged in some extensive project himself, then it would have emerged rather sooner just how unproductive the enterprise would prove.
All oomparative work involves a problem of sources. We oannot evaluate Lewis's performanoe in this respect.
What is worrying, because it does not seem to trouble his (do\vu-to-earth OOllml0nSense) sociological approach, is the categories with whioh he performs his analysis.
We are aware of the diffioulties involved in using suoh terms as 'pathologioal' and 'hysterical' in our own oulture; the problems conoerning their applioation to other oul tures are even more oonsiderable. For instanoe, the oonoept of deviant would qualify as an.' odd-job' . word (Wi ttgenstein) in our OVal oategory system.
But the objeotion does not stop with these psyohologioal terms whioh are easily recognisable as being awkwardly oulture bound. What qualifioation oan we assume 'mystioal', 'witohoraft', 'anoestor oult' or even 'religion' to possess that fit them for oomparative purposes? Or Prof. Lewis~recentbook is an ambitious functionalist-comparative study of an aspect of religion which he claims has been neglected by social anthropologists.
But the objeotion does not stop with these psyohologioal terms whioh are easily recognisable as being awkwardly oulture bound. What qualifioation oan we assume 'mystioal', 'witohoraft', 'anoestor oult' or even 'religion' to possess that fit them for oomparative purposes? Or may we assume that these categories are used as lautQoati~ally' (p.21) as the questions that Lewis asks?
If Lewis really wants to indulge tn this type of oomparative work h9 should at least bear in mind Evans-Pritohard's remark on the Frazerian style of analysis.
That is, he should compare in~heir oompleteness the situa~ions of possession among the Eskimos, hysteria in a London mental hospital and the experiences of a Christian saint in order to dotermirie whether.suoh a category' as eostasy genuinely subsumes these disparate phenomena.
After all, it is . only in the fullness of oontext that the terminology has any meaning at all, and'without this bontextualisation it maY not be realized that ecstasy, in reality, is of as little explanatory use as the term matrilineal.
It. is only too obvious that we as yet simply do not understand enough about different modes of consciousness to embark on Lewis's type of venture.
Why, for instance, is there no mention of James's The Varieties of_Religious Experience which one had assumed would have some relevance? At least it would make the difficulties rather plainer. All Lewis does by seeing possession or witchcraft as protests against society or symbolio strategies of attaok is to oreate a oategory of anomalous behaviour whioh requires a speoial type of explanation. In fact it is exactly the same procedure that the Viotorians employed in their treatment of pri~itive belief and whioh Evans-Pritchard had already cogently critioized.
Frazer assumes oontext and purpose are obvious and thon imputes oertain mental processes to savages. Lewis, in his way, repeats all these errors -and then charges Levi-Strauss with being a neo-Frazeriant This criticism holds even though Lewis (p.36) claims his treatment is not to be regarded as a oomplete explanation.
Lewis, and here he is in good keeping with most sociologists, (and the oomplete opposite of Evans-Pritohard) simply seems tohava no feeling for culture.
We oannot feel that resort to such concepts as 'deprivation' or 'eostasy', really enables him to grasp the 'meaning' of any of the examples he discusses.
It only confirms his sociologioal qualities that he should not really be concerned with meaning at all.
As suoh his book strikes us neophyte Oxford anthropologists as vulgar in the same way as Gluckman's ~stom and Conflict sooiolog~. Lewis simply doesn't seem to sense how systems of meaning should be understood.
The 'validity of my comparisons should be judged by their inherent plausibility and by the extent to whioh they oontribute to tho understanding of religious experienoe'.
We remain unoonvinced, and the use of example after example would do nothing to enhanoe the plausibility of the analysis.
We ought also to enter a oonunent concerning his statement that the import ance of functional similarities as against cultural distinction is acoepted by most anthropologists.
True this might be of those in the backvfaters of British sooial anthropology, but, as with his questions that the social anthropologist 'automatioally asks' (p.2~we can only say it is not true of all. Many anthropologists have radioally different interests to these dis played by Lewis and it is interesting that the newest anthropological trends reoeive no bibliographioal mention in his book.
Not even that sensitive study by Lienha~dt of Diruca self-knowledge in Divinity and Experionoe reoeives a mention. When Levi-Strauss gets a treatment that is nothing short of juvenile (p. 14-15) it is clear that we oannot accept Lewis's olaim to speak for anthro pologists.
In fact, it is quite olear (p.30) that his approaoh and pre oocupations are consoiously sooiological.
Perhaps a sociologist's evaluation of Eostatio Religion would be different, but we oan only feel embarrassment that in 1971 the title should contain the word anthropologioal. It is also laughable that he should regard it as bravery (p.178) to oonsider psychology and thus to extend the provenance of anthropology.
One is reminded of that other London pronouncement in Jarvie's 1964 book 'over to Levi-Strauss' when other departments had been there years before. That is, he should compare in ,their oompleteness the si tua'tions of possession among the Eskimos, hysteria in a London mental hospital and the experiences of a Christian saint in order to determirie whether.suoh a category' as eostasy genuinely subsumes these disparate phenomena.
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If Lewis really wants to indulge in this type of oomparative work h9 should at least bear in mind Evans-Pritchard's remark on the Frazerian style of analysis.
That is, he should compare in ,their oompleteness the si tua'tions of possession among the Eskimos, hysteria in a London mental hospital and the experiences of a Christian saint in order to determirie whether.suoh a category' as eostasy genuinely subsumes these disparate phenomena.
One is reminded of that other London pronounoement in Jarviets 1964 book 'over to Levi-Strauss' when other departments had been there years before. If Lewis's book represents anthropology to the general public as a rapidly ohangingdiscipline, one can only feel that the direction implied is the wrong one.
Anthropology oan advance by redefining its problems. Lewis seems unaware of this and is content to produce answers to problems set by his forbears.
Here he is in good company. There are still departments where anthropologists devise good measures of divoroe rates or where students are encouraged to produoe excellent definitions of age-sets.
All this refinement is of no value if the problem itself was originally ill-conceived.
It is 11ke expending a great amount of energy to establish the exact weight of phlogiston. Lewis's Ecstatic Religion strikes us as similarly outdated and misdirected. There seems to be a vast differenoe of interests between ourselves and the Professor at L.S.E., and to use a joke he himself uses, we can only hope that enthusiasm for his type of work is not catching.
Two Diplorna Students.
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